Tokugawa Era Essay Contest

The Meiji Restoration Era, 1868-1889

by James Huffman Editor's Note: This article was originally written for Japan Society's previous site for educators, "Journey through Japan," in 2003.

Change was the currency of the Meiji era (1868–1912). From the day the teen-aged Mutsuhito claimed power on January 3, 1868 in a relatively tranquil coup called the “Meiji Restoration” (after his reign name) until his death forty-five years later, Japan experienced an evolution so rapid that one Tokyo expatriate said he felt as if he had been alive for 400 years. An isolated, feudalistic island state in 1850, Japan had become a powerful colonial power with the most modern of institutions when Meiji’s son, the Taisho emperor, took the throne in 1912. Both the sources of these changes and the way in which they made Japan “modern” provide the material for one of human history’s more dramatic stories. They also laid the groundwork for the turbulence of Japan’s twentieth century.

Sources of the Meiji Restoration

To understand the dynamism of the Meiji years, one must begin with the factors in the Tokugawa era (1600–1868) that made Japan a unique and sophisticated nation. The first thing about which historians often comment is the period’s stability. Founded by the warrior Tokugawa Ieyasu at the conclusion of centuries of samurai warfare, the Tokugawa bakufu (tent or military government) ruled for more than 250 years in the city of Edo (today’s Tokyo), during which time the most serious fighting consisted of localized peasant riots. The Tokugawa created a centralized “feudal” system in which more than 200 domains or han maintained fiscal and military autonomy, while their lords served an authoritarian government in Edo. Even the Europeans, who had participated in some of the sixteenth century conflicts, were tightly controlled in these years, with most of them excluded from Japan altogether and the Dutch alone allowed to maintain a limited trading presence at Nagasaki, nearly 1,000 miles away from the capital. It is hardly surprising that observers refer to this period as the “pax Tokugawa.”

Undergirding this political stability were unusually high levels of political and educational sophistication that would make rapid, peaceful change possible in the decades after the Restoration. Though critics talk about the inflexibility and inefficiency of the Tokugawa government, the political system nonetheless ranked among the world’s most effective in tying more than 30 million people together and stimulating an energetic national life. Perhaps the most effective feature of that government was the “alternate attendance” (sankin kotai) system that required most of the 250 domain lords to spend every other year in Edo, serving the shogun, and thus stimulated not only national consciousness but an extensive system of roads (for the travel of the lords’ large retinues), towns (for their lodging), trade, and cultural diffusion.

The system also encouraged the growth of important national institutions. Thousands of schools tied to temples, government offices, and private scholars gave Japan a literacy rate of perhaps 40 percent for boys and 10 percent for girls in the early 1800s, ranking it near the top of the world. They also provided a leadership class committed to the Confucian ideal of public service. Industry and trade flourished, even as the samurai class and the Tokugawa government languished economically, giving Japan high levels of capital accumulation. And the culture of the cities was among the most innovative in the world, producing a combination of woodblock prints, kabuki theater, novels, haiku poetry, fashion fads, and lending libraries—much of it tied to the geisha or female entertainers who presided over each city’s entertainment quarters. Scholars have noted that Japan in the early 1800s ranked near the world’s forefront in almost every quantifiable level of development.

At the same time, a set of specific developments (historians would call them contingencies) made late-Tokugawa Japan ripe for change. Many of the country’s leaders grew quite interested in the ways of the West, as they began learning about the industrial revolution and the imperialist adventures that were bringing countries from China to the Philippines under the European sway. At the same time, American and European seaman began visiting Japan’s ports after the early 1800s, seeking an end to the country’s isolation policy. And perhaps most important, the balance between Tokugawa and domain governments began shifting, with large and distant domains such as Satsuma (in southern Kyushu) and Choshu (on western Honshu) experiencing political and economic growth even as the shogunate sunk ever more deeply into a kind of inflexibility caused in part by old age. Thus, while many regions of the country were full of energy and increasing self-confidence in 1850, the Edo government was in decline, staffed by cautious bureaucrats described by one young official as “wooden monkeys.”

In this mix, the Tokugawa decision to open Japan to foreigners in 1854, in compliance with American demands, touched off one of Japan’s most tumultuous periods. With newly arrived Westerners demanding trade, showing off new customs (including the scandalous tendency of women to accompany men to public events), practicing the forbidden Christian religion, and taking sides in Japan’s political disputes, the country’s political life changed irrevocably. Opposition to the Tokugawa arose from several quarters. At one level, lower-ranked samurai called shishi or “men of spirit” began agitating for the ouster of the Westerners almost as soon as Matthew Perry and his followers had been admitted. They were too much on the outside to topple the government, but their terrorist acts disrupted the tranquility of political centers in ways that had not been seen for centuries. More directly threatening to the Tokugawa were the growing challenges after the late 1850s from establishment scholars and political leaders of major domains. The shogunate reacted as aggressively as any regime-under-attack might be expected to, but by the mid-1860s, Choshu was in the hands of an anti-Tokugawa administration, and by late 1868, Shogun Tokugawa Keiki concluded that the best way to preserve order was to resign as shogun and create a system in which he likely would share power as the chief among a council of leaders. His scheme failed, however, and on January 3, 1868, a coup d’état in Meiji’s name brought to power a group of young, visionary samurai from the regional domains.

The Transition to Meiji, 1868–1877

The government that came into being in 1868 had three overriding characteristics: its leaders were young; its policies were pragmatic; and its hold on power was tenuous. The emperor in whose name the new governors ruled was just seventeen years old; the major samurai power-holders from Satsuma and Choshu domains ranged in age from the upper 20s to the “senior” Saigo Takamori, who was just 41; and Iwakura Tomomi, the most important nobleman in the leadership clique, was 43. By Japanese leadership standards, these men were mere juveniles—unbound by the networks and mores of traditional leadership. This, perhaps, is what made them so pragmatic; they developed policies without the restraints of ideology or custom—or of any overriding vision of where Japan should go. Confucian tradition discouraged commerce, but they moved Japan as forcefully and quickly as possible into the world of international commerce. Whereas they once had supported the idea of national seclusion, sometimes fanatically so, now they made the West their model and pursued internationalization with a vengeance. Samurai and nobles all, they abolished the class and status systems and disbanded the feudal domains. One of their central slogans, kuni no tame (“for the sake of the country”) said it all: their overriding commitment was simply to national strength, regardless of what customs or ideologies had to be violated in the pursuit of that goal.

The tenuousness of their power was illustrated by the Boshin War, a violent conflict between the new regime and the Tokugawa followers, which raged for a year and a half after the Restoration. Though the coup often has been called bloodless, and though the carnage was indeed lessened by Keiki’s surrender in February 1868, thousands of his supporters resisted in a civil war that left more than 8,000 dead by the time the fighting ended in Hokkaido in June 1869. It was little wonder that journalists predicted the imminent collapse of the Meiji government well into the 1870s.

All of this meant that the first Meiji years were characterized by a seat-of-the-pants, try-this-try-that style of governing. A “charter oath,” issued in April 1868 promised to unify the classes and seek knowledge from around the world in order to strengthen the emperor’s rule. No one seemed, however, to know just what that meant initially, as the government grappled with inadequate revenues, challenges from imperialist nations, threats from the regional domains, conspiracies by disgruntled samurai across the nation, and a complete lack of precedents for the organizational structures the modern era demanded. One result was that the government structure was reorganized repeatedly in the first years. Another was that membership in the leadership faction kept shifting. Still a third was that policies were revised often. At the same time there was a single, clear direction: toward centralization, solidarity, and involvement in the broader world. And always there was a commitment to making Japan a modern nation, accepted as an equal by the world powers.

Internationalization showed up in two ways. First, the new leaders studied Western models with a zeal born of deep fear that weakness might invite invasion. They sent missions to the West, including a 50-member group headed by head of state Iwakura Tomomi in 1871–1873, to negotiate and to study institutions such as banking, schools, political systems, and treaty structures. They also dispatched young people to study in European and American educational institutions. And they brought hundreds of Westerners, called yatoi (or, in some scholars’ telling, “live machines”) to Japan every year until the late 1870s, to teach English, build railroads and buildings, create an educational system, edit newspapers (for foreign consumption), and teach science. The result was an urban craze for things Western—everything from men’s haircuts to drinking milk, from the solar calendar to ballroom dancing—that made city life heady.

Second, the movement onto the international scene made treaty revision one of the government’s central goals. The treaties of the 1850s had limited the tariffs Japan could charge on imports to an average of about five percent and had required that foreigners who committed crimes in Japan be tried in the courts of the foreign consulates (a system called extraterritoriality). Beside being humiliating, the restrictions deprived Japan of both sovereignty and tariff revenues, money desperately needed for modernization programs. As a result the government sought endlessly to secure fairer treaties during the 1870s. The British consistently blocked reform, however, and extraterritoriality was not ended until 1894, tariff limits until 1911. The treaties thus served as a constant reminder of just how important modernity and power were to Japan’s success in the international arena. Without being regarded as “modern,” Japan would not be taken seriously by Britain and the other imperialist powers; without strength, it could not challenge the foreign gunboats.

The movement toward centralization was illustrated partly by a raft of new regulations: the 1871 decision to replace the semi-feudal domains with modern prefectures, the issuance in 1872–1873 of laws to create a military draft and to require three years of school for all boys and girls, and the standardization of a land tax. It was illustrated more dramatically by two major crises, both centering on the role of the old samurai class. In the first, the Crisis of 1873, the leadership faction was rent asunder by a bitter foreign policy dispute. After Japanese diplomats in Korea had been spoken to rudely by Korean officials, the state council decided to send Saigo Takamori as an emissary to demand an apology, realizing fully that such a mission could precipitate war. When progressive officials, who had been abroad with Iwakura, heard about the plans, they were aghast—not so much at the idea of war as at the potential cost. They managed through intensive maneuvering to get the decision reversed, and the popular Saigo quit office in a rage, taking a number of followers with him. The result was a leaner government, and a less popular one.

The second crisis, the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, was even more serious. After the government had abolished the samurai class in order to save the huge cost of paying annual stipends to every member of the class, a civil rebellion broke out in the southwest—headed by Saigo. The results were devastating, on every level. Word that Saigo was leading the rebellion sent shudders through the country. Former samurai everywhere questioned the government’s policy of using a commoner army to fight the rebels. And the cost was staggering: eight months of bloody fighting, millions of yen, 10,000 men injured, more than 6,000 deaths, and a powerful sense of national loss. Historically, however, the Satsuma Rebellion marked a positive watershed for the Meiji government. With Saigo’s defeat, the country was unified as it had not been since the Restoration; the government’s legitimacy was established; the transitional decade was over.

Creating a Modern System, 1877–1889

Few would have considered the Restoration era complete, however, until a new political system was in place, a system approved as “modern” by the international powers. Only after creating the new structures noted above and defeating the recalcitrant samurai could the rulers focus their energies in that direction.

Before looking at that process, however, a word must be said about the impact of the many changes on the country’s broader populace. If the new system was hard on the traditional samurai class, it was devastating for vast numbers of people: the fishermen, the rickshaw pullers, the construction workers, miners, prostitutes, and newspaper sellers who made the rapid changes possible by doing the hardest work and receiving the least remuneration. The largest such group lived in more than 60,000 villages, where some 28 million farmers (out of a population of 35 million in the late 1870s) provided the country not only with its food but with the bulk of its taxes. The cost of modernizing and expanding the government was placed overwhelmingly on land taxes, which meant that farmers had to bear the brunt, either through direct taxation or in the rents they paid to landlords. When the government’s fiscal retrenchment led to depression in the early 1880s, rice and silk prices plummeted, and bankruptcies soared, pushing many into destitution and thousands into local uprisings against the system. Another group hurt by modernizing policies were Japan’s factory workers, particularly the tens of thousands of girls and women who were forced by poverty into working in the expanding silk and cotton factories. Their willingness to work under inhuman conditions for pittance pay helped Japan compete on the world market; it also produced surprising amounts of resistance, with workers absconding, engaging in work stoppages, and even striking.

A more positive result for the general populace was the diffusion of new ideas and practices into every nook of society. The 1870s saw former samurai in the northeast offend the Buddhist spirits by beginning to eat meat; they saw the rise of barbering and dairy-farming in the Tokyo region; they saw the spread of railroads, modern postal networks, fire-resistant brick buildings, a banking system, public schools, language institutes, modern hospitals—in short, every “modern” institution known in the world’s most progressive cities. The arts also changed, as Western style painting took root. Novels and fiction became increasingly popular, though complex characterization would have to wait until late in the century to become the norm. And literate Japanese by the tens of thousands began reading newspapers. While it would take several more decades for modernity to penetrate the countryside, cities were literally transformed by the drive toward international respect and domestic centralization in this first Meiji decade.

The driving force in all of this lay with the government during the early Meiji years, but one of that force’s most exceptional features was the role of private, popular groups in shaping the political evolution. Indeed the drive toward creating a constitutional system—which everyone agreed was the essential characteristic of a “modern” state—was fueled by a constant, fierce struggle between popular and official forces. (Refer to the Enactment of the Meiji Constitution.) In the mid-1870s, for example, a vigorous “movement for freedom and rights” (jiyu minken undo), led by both former samurai and commoners, stirred the national political life mightily with rallies and petition drives demanding a national assembly, a constitution, and broader participation in the government. When a financial scandal prompted massive protests against the government in 1881, the officials responded in part by promising that a constitution would be granted within a decade. And when Japan’s first political parties were created in response to that promise, the government seriously set about the task of drafting that constitution.

 The political intensity quieted in the mid-1880s, but not the drive toward constitutional government. Ito Hirobumi, one of the youngest Restoration leaders and now a dominating force in official circles, led a group to Europe to study political systems, then headed a task force that created several new institutions (including a peerage, so there would be a pool for selecting a House of Lords) and drafted Asia’s first national constitution. His models and chief advisors were German statists, and when the constitution was promulgated on February 11, 1889, it placed sovereignty solely in the emperor and gave Japan a relatively weak legislature and a strong, transcendent cabinet, with the prime minister appointed by the emperor. But the impact of the freedom and rights forces was apparent in the constitution too, because it also assured limited freedom of speech, religion, and assembly, gave the legislature veto power over the budget, and created an independent judiciary. It was, in short, a middle-of-the-road document that placed Japan in the mainstream of the world powers politically. Papers from London to Shanghai hailed the arrival of constitutional government in Asia, while commoners across the nation celebrated with fireworks and speeches this evidence that the Meiji Restoration’s promise had been fulfilled.

The Restoration Legacy

Though dramatically changed, Japan would not have been called modern yet in 1889 by most observers. The two post-Restoration decades had, however, planted all of those seeds that would mature into full-fledged modernity and imperialistic vigor at the beginning of the twentieth century. At least three legacies of the Restoration decades merit discussion.

The first is nationalism. The rise of nationalism—often called the most important feature of the late 1880s and early 1890s—showed up in many ways: in the widely-heralded pride over the constitution, in the issuance in 1890 of the Imperial Rescript on Education, a stirring document in which school students regularly recited their loyalty to country and emperor, in the increasing public discussions by young writers of Japan’s greatness. One of the most articulate vehicles for the new nationalism was a journal named simply Nihon (Japan), launched the day the constitution was promulgated, for the express purpose of reviving the “unique spirit of the Japanese people.” The seeds of the new national pride lay in the early-Meiji soil, when the government had worked so hard to make the entire populace aware of their Japaneseness, creating national holidays, making the emperor both sovereign and high priest, sending Tokyo newspapers to every part of the country, instituting compulsory education and military service. By the twentieth century, the nationalism would become worrisome, as it propelled Japan into aggressive actions abroad. At the end of the Restoration period, however, people saw it merely as an effective means of getting people to support the state’s drive to modernity and power.
The second departure of the 1890s was the rising importance of military affairs in national life. In 1894, Japan launched its first major foreign war since the 1500s (and its second foreign war ever), thrashing China in the Sino-Japanese War and beginning its experience with empire by securing Taiwan as a colony. A decade after that, it defeated Russia, one of the European powers, setting the stage for colonies in Korea and Manchuria. And with those wars, the army and navy became central actors in nearly every national decision, major factors in the country’s political and economic life. Again, the early Meiji years had set the stage. One of the earliest slogans of the Restoration era was fukoku kyohei (rich country, strong army); in 1872 Japan had begun drafting men into the army; and in 1874, it had sent 3,000 troops to Taiwan, for a short, victorious engagement with aboriginal groups who had killed some 54 shipwrecked Okinawans. The nation also had begun the acquisition of territory in these years, taking over the Ryukyu Islands to the south in 1879, three years after negotiating with Russia to gain control of the Kuril Islands to the north. All of these were relatively minor episodes, but they confirmed a fundamental approach. Convinced that military strength alone would assure respect and security in an imperialist world, the early-Meiji leaders had set the nation on a course toward military might, a course that would make war and empire central facets of national policy by the turn of the century.

The third legacy of the Restoration years was the march to modernity. Most students agree that the period between the Sino- and Russo-Japanese Wars saw a genuine mass society emerge in Japan’s cities. These were the years that gave Japan its first major industrial takeoff, the period that produced mass-circulation newspapers, department stores, publicly treated water systems, social and class divisions, moving pictures, wristwatches, safety razors, increasingly popular public intellectual debates, and beer halls—all the trappings of modern, urban society. (See Sino-Japanese War.) And they were the years in which commoners, called minshu, began to take an active part in the nation’s public and political life. To say that this development represented a mere speed-up of the early Meiji programs is to state the obvious. When the Charter Oath promised in 1868 to seek knowledge from around the world, it set Japan on a course of studying, emulating, adapting—and finally surpassing—peoples everywhere, a path that would bring the Restoration era to fulfillment, even as it launched Japan into the more troubling arena of colonialism and empire.

Related Links:

Timeline of Religion and Nationalism in Meiji and Imperial Japan
Timeline of Modern Japan


Tokugawa Japan: An Introductory Essay
by Marcia Yonemoto, University of Colorado at Boulder

            Sir George Sansom’s history of Japan was first published in 1932 and used in U.S. college classrooms into the 1980s. In it, he described the Tokugawa period (1603-1868) as an era of oppressive “feudal” rule. In this view, hierarchical divisions between samurai, peasant, artisan, and merchant were strictly maintained. Sansom described a system in which swaggering samurai used their swords to cut down commoners. Miserable peasants barely eked out a living, and urban merchants were scorned as unethical profiteers. According to Sansom, change was loathed. The government kept the rest of the world out, denying “themselves all the gifts which the West then had to offer.” This move, said Sansom, “arrested the cultural development of Japan” (Sansom 1932, 455, 457).

            Scholars today largely dismiss this view. Yet it remains pervasive. Films and manga comics glorify samurai bravado. But they ignore much else about the period. Thus, even the well-informed often are surprised when they read more recent histories of the period. Such newer works describe the political system as a rational “integral bureaucracy.” This system was “not merely a samurai institution.” Rather, it depended on non-elite “commercial agents and activities” (Totman 1981, p. 133). Newer histories call the era “a time of extraordinary social growth and change. In terms of population and production, urbanization and commercialization, and societal sophistication and elaboration, the century was one of unparalleled development.”

            What should readers make of these discrepancies? What do teachers and students really need to know about the Tokugawa period? This brief essay addresses these questions by (1) sketching the outline of Tokugawa history, touching on politics, economics, society, and culture; (2) introducing some historical debates regarding the Tokugawa period; and (3) giving references for further reading on important topics.

The Tokugawa Political Settlement

            The first Tokugawa shogun was Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542-1616). He came of age in an era of violence and conflict. During the Warring States period (c.1467-1590), centralized political authority—the imperial court and the military government (shogunate, or bakufu)—had lost its effectiveness. Practical political power had passed into the hands of approximately 200 local warlords, or daimyō. The daimyō controlled their own territories. These territories were called domains. By the end of the period, some daimyō had become extremely powerful. Each commanded large swaths of territory and tens of thousands of warriors.

            One such leader was Oda Nobunaga (1534-82). Nobunaga was a daimyō from the province of Owari in central Honshu. Using strategic alliances and brutal military tactics, Nobunaga brought about one-third of the country under his control. When he was assassinated in 1582, his most able general, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-98), took his place. Hideyoshi was a brilliant military and political tactician. His talent and ambition had allowed him to rise from a humble peasant background. Building on Nobunaga’s achievements, Hideyoshi brought all of Japan under his control by about 1590.

            Two problems marked Hideyoshi’s later years. One was his growing belief that his power was unlimited. This megalomania was reflected in unsuccessful attempts to invade Korea and China. The second problem was his difficulty in producing an heir. At his death in 1597, he had only one infant son. He entrusted his son’s fate to five trusted allies. Each swore to protect the heir and help ensure the Toyotomi clan’s future. Among these allies was Tokugawa Ieyasu. Ieyasu controlled significant territory in northeastern Honshu. Ieyasu’s castle headquarters was located in the city of Edo (now Tokyo). Hideyoshi had been dead scarcely three years when Ieyasu turned on his former lord. In 1600, his forces defeated the Toyotomi. In 1603, Ieyasu established a new shogunate in his family’s name. He went to war once again in 1615 to completely wipe out the Toyotomi and their allies. From then on, the Tokugawa maintained political authority for 253 years without resorting to military combat.

            The primary political goal of Tokugawa Ieyasu and his heirs—his son, Hidetada (1578-1632) and grandson, Iemitsu (1604-1651)—was to cut off the roots of potential dissent and rebellion. In the late 1630s, Tokugawa Iemitsu expelled Portuguese and Spanish Catholic missionaries and traders. This decision was motivated more by the political threat posed by converts, especially daimyō converts, than by dislike of Christian doctrine or the foreign presence in Japan. The early shoguns were wary of other daimyō. Many of these daimyō were recent allies who were not totally committed to Tokugawa rule.

            The Tokugawa shoguns built on the ideas and tactics of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi. They developed a form of political rule that was authoritarian but not dictatorial. This can be seen in the way the early shoguns distributed land to their daimyō allies. The Tokugawa kept only about a quarter of the land available for redistribution for themselves. Of the remaining lands, the shogunate allocated about 10 percent to blood relations (known as the collateral, or shinpandaimyō houses). Another 26 percent went to longtime loyal allies, the fudaidaimyō. The remaining 38 percent went to the most recent, less stable allies. These allies were the “outside,” or tozamadaimyō.

            The early Tokugawa shoguns’ use of land distribution to both win the allegiance and encourage the dependence of daimyō illustrates the blend of resourcefulness, pragmatism, and foresight characteristic of Tokugawa political rule. In its policies, the shogunate was careful to balance demands on daimyō with privileges granted to them. For example, the shogunate never directly taxed the daimyō. Instead, it exercised indirect levies such as requiring daimyō to supply labor and raw materials for the construction and maintenance of castles, roads, post stations, and the like. The shogunate also forced all daimyō to commute between their home domains and the shogunal capital of Edo, a time- and resource-consuming practice. The shogunate exercised authority by compelling the wives and children of all daimyō to reside permanently in Edo. There, they were under the shogun’s watchful eye. Daimyō were also required to secure shogunal approval before marrying. At the same time, daimyō were for the most part free to govern their domains as they saw fit. They issued their own law codes and administered justice. Some printed and circulated their own currency. The shogunate intervened only if requested to do so. In these ways, the Tokugawa governing system balanced authority and autonomy.

Economic Growth and Social Change

            Studying the Tokugawa era reveals many seeming contradictions. Of these, perhaps none is more striking than the contrast between the Tokugawa rulers’ vision of the ideal economic system and the reality of economic growth and change. With a few notable exceptions, the shogunate and daimyō viewed the economy in simple agronomist terms. In this view, the peasant’s role was to produce basic foodstuffs. Peasants were to give a good portion of their products in tax to support the ruling classes. Artisans used their skills to craft necessary non-food items. Finally, goods that could not be acquired through any other means could be purchased from merchants. Merchants were deemed the necessary evil of the economic system.

            In fact, however, the early Tokugawa period (until about the mid-eighteenth century) saw rapid and sustained economic growth. This growth occurred first in the agricultural sector. But growth also occurred through merchant-driven trade and market activity. The concentration of population in cities served as a major impetus for growth and change. Yet many Tokugawa authorities clung to their old notions of a static, agrarian-based economy. The samurai class, who were forbidden from engaging in profitable trade or farming, were disadvantaged by Tokugawa policies and attitudes toward the economy. The ruling class was prevented from taking advantage of economic growth. At the same time, substantial benefits went to merchants and even to market-savvy peasants. Economic growth thus contributed to the inversion of the status hierarchy enshrined in the “four class system.” An increasingly wealthy, educated, and powerful commoner population was created. Meanwhile, samurai, especially those of low rank, steadily became economically weaker.

            Growth in Agricultural Production and Population. During the Warring States period, agricultural production grew. Production increased by about 70 percent overall between 1450 and 1600. Growth continued into the early Tokugawa period. Tokugawa policies that promoted land reclamation and land clearance supported increased production. In addition, the disarming of peasants and local religious communities that came with the “Tokugawa peace” put more people back on the land. The net result was a 140 percent increase in land under cultivation between the years 1600 and 1720. Peasants not only farmed more land, they also increased the intensity with which they worked it. Through careful monitoring and the spread of information about cropping patterns, fertilizers, and the like, Japanese peasants in the Tokugawa period continued to increase their land’s productivity.

            The overall growth in agricultural productivity caused a rise in the general well-being of the people. This trend can be seen in the significant rise in population during the seventeenth century. Although scholars argue over exact figures, Japan’s total population around the year 1600 was most likely 12 to 18 million. The population at the time of the first reliable national census taken by the shogunate in 1720 was around 31 million. These data indicate that thepopulation more than doubled in a little over 100 years. For a number of reasons, including family planning and voluntary limitation of family size among the peasantry, population growth leveled off in the eighteenth century. Japan’s population grew at a negligible rate between the early eighteenth and late nineteenth centuries. The economy, however, continued to grow, leading to an economic surplus. That surplus was a key factor in Japan’s rapid industrialization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

            Growth in Markets and Trade. Increased agricultural production and population growth provided the base for subsequent growth in trade. Increases in trade were also enabled by such developments as the creation of reliable and effective transportation networks. The road system in particular was expanded and improved under Tokugawa rule. Shipping networks on sea routes were also expanded, especially those linking the major commercial centers in western and eastern Japan. Along with growth in trade came growth in the use of money. Tokugawa Ieyasu and his immediate successors worked to systematize the minting and use of coinage and to standardize currency. In turn, this greatly facilitated domestic trade. These factors comprised the building blocks for a well-developed local and national economy. Regional and domainal capitals were linked by good roads. Smaller market towns and settlements grew along these roads. Local areas developed specialty goods and products. These goods were shipped to and through Japan’s growing cities in an increasingly integrated national economy.

            Growth of Cities. During the Warring States period, local lords began to gather their warriors around them in headquarters centered on fortified castles. This tendency was formalized by Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu, who demanded that their retainers live in the capital cities rather than in their domains. As a result, so-called castle towns (jōkamachi) sprung up in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Some 90 new towns appeared between 1572 and 1590 alone. The number continued to grow in subsequent decades. The emergence of castle towns and later of cities had a significant economic impact. Building cities required assembling, equipping, feeding, housing, and supervising huge numbers of laborers and technical specialists. It also required importing vast amounts of resources: soil, stone, lumber, thatch, kilns for baking roof tiles, charcoal, and the like. From the late sixteenth century on, these labor forces came to number in the tens of thousands. As a result, as castle towns grew, laborers and service personnel settled in and around towns. Samurai settled near the castles of their lords. The commoners who served the samurai moved into adjacent areas. Over time castle towns evolved into urban areas.

            Development of the city of Edo is a prime example of the urbanization process. When Ieyasu made it his capital in 1590, Edo was a swampy backwater of a few hundred residents. Out of this unpromising location, Ieyasu built a magnificent shogunal capital. Laborers cut down forests, leveled hills to fill in wetlands, rerouted rivers, and dredged creeks and canals. They built bridges and walls, erected shrines and temples, and constructed buildings. Among the buildings erected were opulent daimyō mansions and the magnificent castle of the shogun. Warehouses, storefronts, and common dwellings were also built. By 1600, Edo was a town of some 5000 dwellings. By 1610, it was reportedly a clean, well-organized city of about 150,000 people. As samurai retainers of the shogun and of daimyō flooded into the city in the early seventeenth century, the population zoomed upward. By 1657, Edo had about 500,000 residents. By 1720, it was the world’s largest city outside of China, with a population of about 1.4 million. Half a million of these residents were samurai.

            Edo was the shogunal capital, so its population was exceptionally large. But smaller, regional castle towns also grew significantly. Kanazawa, headquarters of an extensive domain on the Japan Sea coast, was a town of 5,000 in 1580. It grew to 120,000 in 1710. Nagoya, a small town in the early seventeenth century, had become a regional center of 64,000 residents by 1692. Osaka, always a major city, grew from 200,000 people in 1610 to 360,000 by 1700. It hit a peak of half a million by the late eighteenth century.

            Growth was good for the economy in general. It affected different classes differently, however. In particular, merchants benefited from the increase in trade, markets, and urbanization. Samurai suffered from those same phenomena. Why did the samurai lose out? First, samurai were paid in fixed stipends, disbursed in rice. These stipends were based on an individual’s rank and office and did not increase at a pace equal to the rise in prices. Second, with the growth of the market and monetization of the economy, samurai had to trade their rice stipends for cash. This process was controlled by merchants in Edo and Osaka. It put samurai at the mercy of both the unstable market price for rice and the greed of merchant moneychangers. Finally, samurai were forbidden by law from engaging in farming or commerce, which might have afforded them some economic relief. All of these factors made it almost impossible for samurai to benefit from the growth occurring in the economy. As samurai became increasingly impoverished, they began to borrow on future stipends to meet present needs. Thus they put themselves in debt to merchant lenders. Having samurai at their mercy not only earned the merchants a measure of profit, it also gave them significant symbolic leverage over their samurai superiors. For the samurai, being indebted to lowly merchants was extremely galling. Many low-ranking samurai whose stipends gave them barely enough to get by felt they had to scrimp and save while merchants prospered. Matters were made worse by the fact that samurai had to keep up appearances. Protocol deemed that they dress properly, live in good style, and engage in the social activities (which involved expensive gift-giving) that were required of them, but were increasingly beyond their economic means.

            Tokugawa authorities were aware of the problems facing samurai. They repeatedly tried to shore up the political and moral order by elaborating on the unique role of samurai as moral exemplars and scholar/administrators. By definition, commoners could not fulfill those roles. Through the Kyōhō Reforms of the early eighteenth century and the Kansei Reforms at the turn of the nineteenth century, the shogunate enacted measures aimed at stabilizing and strengthening the economic and political status of the samurai. But the authorities’ reassertion of proper political order could not change reality. Neither shogun nor daimyō could offer much practical help to financially strapped samurai. More broad-minded thinkers such as the philosopher Ogyū Sorai (1666-1728) proposed radical reforms. One such reform was returning the samurai to the land so they could farm. Another was overhauling the office and rank system so that lower-ranking “men of talent” could rise to positions of power. These men often languished in idleness while less deserving sons of high-ranking families inherited their fathers’ positions. In the end, economic growth in the Tokugawa period favored commoners over the elite.

The Emergence of Commoner Culture

            While they were not shy about commenting wryly on the state of society, urban commoners were not political activists. Peasant protests did break out in the eighteenth century, largely due to authorities’ failure to provide relief during times of crop failure and food shortage. But the new urban bourgeoisie did not attempt to overthrow the warrior government. Rather, urban commoners tended to turn away from the troublesome world of politics. They used their newfound wealth to fashion a new style of life and art. While the new style borrowed aspects of elite “high” culture, it was in many ways utterly new to the early modern urban scene. By the Genroku period (1688-1703), one could see in Edo and other cities a flourishing merchant class that was developing a cultural style all its own. Merchants flaunted their wealth, building enormous houses and dressing in finery that exceeded that of samurai. The shogunate was not at all happy about this. It repeatedly issued laws forbidding merchants to wear fine silk clothes and restricting the construction of large and showy homes in merchant quarters.

            However, such laws were difficult to enforce. Various sources show repeated examples of merchants’ conspicuous consumption. By the mid-eighteenth century, popular representations abounded of the poor samurai pawning the clothes and swords off his back for a little extra cash. Then a merchant redeemed them and paraded around the city in the purchased finery. Such sights enraged samurai. Yet they had to suppress their anger and keep up the façade of reserve and prosperity appropriate to their status. As a popular saying of the time went, “if a samurai is starving, he uses a toothpick all the same.”

            Despite their economic plight (or perhaps to gain relief from the misery of it), samurai frequented the entertainment areas originally created by and for merchants. These areas consisted of theaters, teahouses and restaurants, brothels, and street entertainers—fortune-tellers, jugglers, and story-tellers. Brothels were a new feature in the cultural life of cities. Prostitution had a long history in Japan. Not until the Tokugawa period did the government seek to control it through licensing and surveillance. Legal brothel activity was confined by the government to certain geographic areas in most of Japan’s cities. These areas were referred to as the licensed quarters. Of course, there was also much illegal prostitution in cities. The shogunate could scarcely control it, much less eradicate it.

            The high-ranking courtesans (yūjo) of the Yoshiwara were not common prostitutes. Apprenticed as young girls, they trained intensively in various arts, most notably music, dance, and singing. They were ranked according to their level of training and experience, much like the geisha that still exist today. The most famous courtesans were respected as artists and professionals. They were also made famous through their depiction in plays, fiction, and the visual arts. Indeed, many became movie-star-like trendsetters. Men wanting to meet with a high-ranking courtesan had to go through an elaborate and expensive process of courting her before he could even lay eyes on her. Technically, the pleasure quarters were enclaves for commoners. Samurai were banned on the grounds that they were supposed to be upright, moral, and frugal characters with no time for crass indulgences. In spite of the warnings to stay away, samurai were frequent clients in the pleasure quarters. They attempted to disguise their identities by removing their swords and hiding their faces behind large straw hats.           
            The pleasure quarters could be extremely costly. Contemporary sources are filled with tales of wealthy merchants and samurai who drove themselves to financial ruin after falling in love with a courtesan. Indeed, the dilemmas of love and money were the fodder for many writers and artists of the Genroku period and later. This period saw the development not only of woodblock prints, or ukiyo-e, but also the emergence of the first great popular writers and dramatists. Two examples are Ihara Saikaku (1642-93) in prose fiction and Chikamatsu Monzaemon (1653-1725) in drama. Saikaku was an Osaka merchant and amateur poet who late in life turned to writing fiction. Most of his stories are based on the lives of Osaka commoners. Saikaku’s stories cover two general topics: love and money. They often have a light-handed, somewhat parodic moral message to them. The first of his works of prose fiction, Life of a Sensuous Man (Kōshoku ichidai otoko, 1682), is written in 54 chapters. (That this was a parody of the structure of Murasaki Shikibu’s eleventh-century classic The Tale of Genji would have been obvious to his audience.) The book was a commercial success, thus inspiring the rest of Saikaku’s early stories on similar themes from the perspectives of both men and women. Saikaku’s stories dramatized the lives of common city people, their obsession with making and spending money, and their free spirited nature, which led them into various sorts of romantic and financial binds. Saikaku almost single-handedly raised merchant life, previously seen as tedious and mundane, to the level of art.

            Chikamatsu Monzaemon wrote mainly for the theater, both kabuki and bunraku (puppet theater). Chikamatsu’s texts were written to be narrated or sung with musical accompaniment. They featured high drama, with twists and turns of plot. Early in his career, Chikamatsu wrote about contemporary events like the “great political disturbances” (oie sōdō) in military households. These works chronicled conflicts between rightful rulers and unlawful usurpers. Later on, Chikamatsu turned to more commoner-centered dramas. These focused on emotional conflicts, often conflicts between social duty or obligation (giri) and human feeling (ninjō). He is most famous for his plays dealing with “love suicides” (shinjū). Love suicides were a real-life phenomenon in which two lovers, committed to other people or occupations (the woman was often a courtesan, the man often a married merchant), resolve to die together rather than live apart. Plays based on this theme, such as Chikamatsu’s classic Love Suicides at Amijima (Shinjū ten no Amijima, 1721), were extremely popular. The essential conflict represented in shinjū tales, a conflict that pulls an individual in two irreconcilable directions, was at the core of most Tokugawa drama. Often, the only solution was death. Love suicide was seen to be the ultimate demonstration of love and devotion. It provided a kind of commoner’s version of the samurai’s seppuku, or suicide for honor.

            The themes of honor and sacrifice inherent in such highly dramatic stories made commoners feel their culture had something in common with that of the elites. Yet there is a distinct commoner twist to these ideas. This twist both honors and degrades the great samurai tradition of self-sacrifice. Actual incidents of love suicide seem to have proliferated in the late 1600s, perhaps becoming even more common in the 1700s. They became a cultural fad encouraged by the romanticization of the act on stage. In 1722, the shogunate forbade the treatment of shinjū on stage, seeing it as an offense against proper family order. The phenomenon of love suicide—both actual and staged—brings to the fore the issue of cultural fads and their spread: How, exactly, did ideas circulate?

Literacy, Education, and the “Library of Public Information”

            Assessing popular literacy before the advent of modern universal education is difficult. Historians use many techniques to estimate the nature and level of literacy in pre- and early-modern societies. Still, their findings are often tentative. Among the most common techniques is analyzing signatures on official documents (wills, marriage records, etc.) as a measure of people’s ability to write. Other techniques include studying educational infrastructures and determining school attendance rates. Historians also look at data on cultural phenomena such as publishing and circulation of books and other printed matter.

            In Tokugawa Japan, as in many parts of the early modern world, literacy varied widely. Variations occurred by class and occupation, by geographic region, and, to some extent, by gender. The ruling elites, Buddhist and Shinto clergy, and commoner intellectuals on the fringes of the elite (Confucian scholars, doctors, and minor officials) tended to be quite learned. They possessed considerable knowledge of Japanese and Sino-Japanese (or kanbun, the style of writing derived from classical Chinese, which was used in formal discourse). They also knew the classical works of both the Japanese and Chinese literary and philosophical traditions. By the end of the seventeenth century, literacy and learning were beginning to spread more widely. Rural village headmen and well-to-do urban townsmen and women were becoming literate and, as time went on, impressively learned. These people became the primary consumers of popular literature and of the arts.

            The infrastructure for popular education developed considerably in the Tokugawa period. Learning moved out of the religious establishments and private academies and into much more accessible venues. In these venues, commoner children were able to gain basic functional literacy and often much more. The demand for books was thus extremely high. Publishers in the major cities churned out texts of all sorts. While Buddhist and Confucian texts remained the mainstays of highbrow publishing, many more publishers produced for the general reading audience. Illustrated fiction and poetry were popular. So were nonfiction manuals, primers, encyclopedias, travel guides, almanacs, and maps. As printed materials circulated among ever-greater numbers of readers, they conditioned in people certain patterns of thought and ultimately of behavior. As one scholar has put it, there emerged in Tokugawa Japan a broad-based and widely read “library of public information,” which produced commonly held forms of social knowledge (Berry 2006, 13, 17).

            When faced with the question of precisely what percentages of what sorts of people were literate, historians do not give a precise answer. The data simply is not conclusive. The best we can do is point to figures that may serve as broad indicators of the dimensions of literacy. Among samurai, who made up 6 to 7 percent of the population, literacy was almost universal and generally of a very high level. The degree of learning varied, however, according to rank, office, and wealth. There are accounts of illiterate samurai, especially later in the Tokugawa period. These cases occurred among the lowest, most impoverished ranks. Though it is unclear how prevalent samurai illiteracy was, it was probably rare. It was certainly the source of great shame for the unlettered individual and his family.

            High literacy is common in an elite ruling class. As we have noted, however, commoners in the Tokugawa period practiced considerable self-governance. The Tokugawa state was very bureaucratic. Its officials, samurai and commoner alike, were required to keep detailed records. They also had to write a great deal of correspondence. Official duties thus demanded high levels of literacy not only among samurai, but also among the upper strata of urban and rural commoner populations who held such responsible positions as city ward official or village headman. Recent research indicates that, by the end of the seventeenth century, the rural elite—numbering some 200-300,000 out of a total population of around 30 million, or less than 0.1 percent of the population—possessed “extraordinarily high literacy and numeracy” in order to fulfill their many administrative duties (Rubinger 2007, 30).

            Below the rural elite were the landowning farmers. Their numbers varied over time and by region. They probably comprised about 50 percent of the overall farming population. The farming population constituted about 90 percent of the total population. Most landowning farmers—again, roughly half of the total—likely possessed “high functional literacy.” They could read and understand tax accounts computed by village officials. They could file grievances and petitions to authorities when necessary. Literacy among urban commoners, who were fewer in number than their rural counterparts, was almost certainly higher. Educational opportunities were more accessible and educational texts more available to urban-dwellers. Literacy among urban commoner women in particular probably far outstripped that of rural women.

            Literacy and education were by no means monopolized by the elite in Tokugawa Japan. Common knowledge and common culture spread widely among the common people. This widening of the knowledge base greatly facilitated the subsequent development of the modern industrial nation-state.

The Discontented and the End of an Era

            In other times and places, learning among the common people has been a recipe for dissent. Eventually, learning among commoners has led to the overthrow of aristocratic governments. This was not true in Tokugawa Japan. Unrest did occur. Peasant protest in particular was widespread and sometimes intense in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Ultimately, however, those responsible for overthrow of the Tokugawa regime were members of the ruling class itself: the samurai. This kind of “aristocratic revolution” is unusual in world history.

            Why and how did samurai overthrow a government that was ostensibly created in their own interest? To answer this question, one must first look at which samurai became involved in the movement to overthrow the shogunate and “restore” the emperor. The major actors were low-ranking samurai from the tozama domains. Particularly involved were the powerful and autonomous domains of Satsuma in southernmost Kyūshū, Chōshū in far western Honshu, and Tosa on Shikoku. Low-ranking samurai had long observed that the system of rank and office under the Tokugawa had become entirely hereditary. They believed it did not sufficiently take merit into account. One born into a family of low rank could never expect to obtain an official appointment or rise to a position of any power or wealth. Moreover, many low-ranking samurai felt themselves to be abler than those of higher birth. Those of higher birth glided into office by virtue of blood right. Many of the low-ranking samurai were not afraid to speak their minds. In the later Tokugawa period, the phrase daimyō gei, or “a daimyō’s skill,” came to indicate someone or something entirely lacking in talent or quality.

            Samurai grievances were compounded by the events of the early decades of the nineteenth century. Bad crop harvests in the 1830s resulted in widespread famine, disease, and death. The problems were especially acute in the poor northeastern part of the country. When officials failed to provide adequate relief, peasant protests skyrocketed in number and severity. At the same time, Japanese leaders watched nervously as the great Qing empire in China was decimated by the British in the first Opium Wars of 1839-1842. China was thereafter “carved up like a melon” by the other Western powers. The Japanese had already fended off advances by the Russians in the 1790s and early 1800s and by the British in the 1820s. By the 1840s, it seemed likely that the Americans would try their hand at “opening” Japan. In 1853, a U.S. naval delegation led by Commodore Matthew C. Perry arrived with demands from U.S. President Millard Fillmore. Fillmore demanded that Japan agree to trade and diplomatic relations with the United States. The shogun was given a half-year to consider Perry’s request. Observers, especially powerful daimyō, saw that the shogunate had no new ideas about how to handle the foreign threat, much less the domestic problems wracking the country. In the end, shogunal officials agreed, in spite of the emperor’s disapproval, to sign trade and diplomatic treaties with the United States. As in China, the terms gave great advantages to the Western powers. Japan was relegated to semi-colonial status.

            For pro-imperial, anti-shogunal forces, the foreign crises, in particular the signing of the treaty with the United States, were the last straw. Plans to overthrow the Tokugawa regime began in earnest in the 1860s. Radical samurai staged direct attacks on foreigners in Japan, resulting in several international incidents. The most serious of these incidents sparked the bombardment of domains in Satsuma and Chōshū by Western naval forces. Finally, in January 1868, combined military forces of the domains of Satsuma and Chōshū marched into Kyoto, took control of the imperial palace, and proclaimed the restoration of the emperor and the abolition of the Tokugawa shogunate. Court nobles and daimyō would form a new government in place of the old. Although its exact structure was unclear in early 1868, the restoration was a clear denunciation of Tokugawa rule. The last shogun, Tokugawa Yoshinobu (or Keiki), retreated to Edo. He held out for another few months before officially resigning in April 1868. Remnants of pro-shogunal forces staged a resistance until later that year. They were ultimately defeated.

            Although the Tokugawa regime ended in 1868, it bequeathed a deep and rich political, economic, and cultural legacy to modern Japan. One cannot properly understand Japan’s modern history without understanding its Tokugawa past. Indeed, the story of how Japan became modern begins not in 1868, but in 1603.

Sources Cited

Berry, Mary Elizabeth, Japan in Print: Information and Nation in the Early Modern Period (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).

Rubinger, Richard, Popular Literacy in Early Modern Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007).

Sansom, G.B., Japan: A Short Cultural History (New York: Century, 1932).

Totman, Conrad, Japan Before Perry: A Short History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).


The Tokugawa Political Settlement

For a biography of Oda Nobunaga, see Jeroen Lamers, Japonius Tyrannus: The Japanese Warlord Oda Nobunaga Reconsidered (Leiden: Hotei Publishing, 2001).

For a biography of Hideyoshi, see Mary Elizabeth Berry, Hideyoshi (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).

For a useful and visually rich (hundreds of illustrations, graphs and maps) survey of the founding and development of the city of Edo, see Akira Naito, Edo, the City That Became Tokyo: An Illustrated History (New York: Kodansha International, 2003).

For more on Christianity in early modern Japan, see Jurgis Elisonas, The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 4: Early Modern Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); for a study of international relations and diplomacy in the Tokugawa period that refutes the idea that Tokugawa Japan was a “closed country,” see Ronald P. Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Historians have characterized the type of government practiced in the Tokugawa period in various ways: “an integrated yet decentralized state structure,” the “compound state,” and Edwin O. Reischauer’s celebrated oxymoron “centralized feudalism” are only a few of the often awkward terms devised to describe the essential Tokugawa balance of authority and autonomy. “Integrated yet decentralized state structure” comes from Eiko Ikegami, The Taming of the Samurai: Honorific Individualism and the Making of Early Modern Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 164-176. Ikegami also uses the term “neo-feudal” in a comparative context. “The compound state” is used by Mark Ravina, following Mizubayashi Takeshi, in “State-building and Political Economy in Early-modern Japan,” Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 54, No. 4 (November 1995), pp. 997-1022. “Centralized feudalism” appears in Edwin O. Reischauer, “Japanese Feudalism,” in Rushton Coulborn, ed., Feudalism in History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956).

Economic Growth and Social Change

When speaking in aggregate demographic or economic terms, it is important to note that growth and decline, whether in terms of population or economy, varied considerably in terms of geographic region. In general, the most economically advanced and prosperous areas of the country were the Kinai Plain, the area of central-western Honshu surrounding the cities of Kyoto and Osaka; northern Kyūshū; and, by the mid-Tokugawa period, the Kantō Plain area around the city of Edo. By contrast, the most economically backward and poor areas of Japan tended to be found in the northeast, in what is today called the Tōhoku region and in the Tokugawa period was comprised of the large province of Dewa and Mutsu.

The Emergence of Commoner Culture

For a partial translation of Saikaku’s Life of a Sensuous Man, see Haruo Shirane, ed., Early Modern Japanese Literature: An Anthology, 1600-1900 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 45-57.

A full translation of Chikamatsu’s Love Suicides at Amijima can be found in Donald Keene, Four Major Plays of Chikamatsu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

Literacy, Education, and the Library of Public Information

In his recent study of popular literacy in early modern Japan, Richard Rubinger argues that “…the Japanese data demonstrate that in certain circumstances geography may be a more influential variable with respect to literacy attainment than gender.” See Richard Rubinger, Popular Literacy in Early Modern Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007), p. 7.

For an absorbing account of a ne’er-do-well samurai in the early 19th century who claimed to have overcome illiteracy in order to write his autobiography of sorts, see Katsu Kōkichi, Musui’s Story: The Autobiography of a Tokugawa Samurai, translated by Teruko Craig (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988).

The definition of 90 percent of Japan’s population as farmers is based on the estimate that by 1700, roughly 10 percent of Japan’s population lived in cities with populations over 10,000; half of that 10 percent lived in cities with populations over 100,000. By comparison, only 2 percent of Europeans lived in cities of over 100,000. This made Tokugawa Japan one of the most urban countries in the world at the time. Figures on urbanization are from Andrew Gordon, A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 23.

The Discontented and the End of an Era

The term “aristocratic revolution” comes from Thomas C. Smith, “Japan’s Aristocratic Revolution,” in Native Sources of Japanese Industrialization, 1750-1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 133-147.

For more on the debate on merit, see Thomas C. Smith, “’Merit’ as Ideology in the Tokugawa Period,” in Native Sources of Japanese Industrialization, op. cit., p. 169.


Copyright © 2010 Program for Teaching East Asia, University of Colorado. Permission is given to reproduce this essay for classroom use only. Other reproduction is prohibited without written permission from the Program for Teaching East Asia.


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